We study a communication variant of local search. There is some fixed, commonly known graph G. Alice holds f A and Bob holds f B , both are functions that specify a value for each vertex. The goal is to find a local maximum of f A + f B with respect to G, i.e., a vertex v for which (
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the communication complexity of local search problems. The general problem involves a search over some "universe" V , for an element v * ∈ V that maximizes, at least "locally", some objective function f ∶ V → R. The notion of "locality" is formalized by putting a fixed, known, neighbourhood structure E on the set of elements, so the requirement of local optimality is that for all u ∈ V such that (v * ,u) ∈ E we have that f (v * ) ≥ f (u). The notion of local optimality is interesting from two points of view: first, it captures the outcome of a wide range of "gradual-improvement" heuristics where the neighbourhood structure represents the types of gradual improvements allowed, and second, locally-optimal solutions provide a notion of stability, where the neighborhood structure models the possible "deviations" from stability.
In the context of computational complexity, local search problems are captured by the complexity class PLS [17] which is a subset of the well studied class TFNP (defined in [20] and studied, e.g., in [6, 9, 16, 26] ): search problems for which a witness always exists ("total search problems") and can by efficiently verified ("in NP"). The problem has also been widely studied in the model of query complexity where the cost of an algorithm is the number of black-box queries to the objective function f , from the pioneering work of [2] on the Boolean hypercube, to a rather complete characterization of not only the deterministic query complexity but also the randomized and even quantum complexities on any graph [1, 28, 29] .
The interest in analyzing local search from a communication complexity point of view is clear: in essentially any application, the objective function f is not really given as a "black box" but is somehow determined by the problem structure. When this structure has any element of distributed content then communication may become an important bottleneck. The question of how the information is distributed is key: in the simplest imaginable scenario, the search space V is split somehow between the (say, two) parties, where each party holds the values f (v) for its subset of v ∈ V (the fixed commonly known neighbourhood structure still involves all of V ). However, in this scenario even a global maximum (which is certainly also a local one) can be easily found with a small amount of communication by each player finding the maximum among his subset, and only communicating and comparing the maxima of the parties. Thus, for the problem to be interesting we must split the information f (v) of each vertex between the parties. There are various ways to do this and the most natural one, conceptually and in terms of applications, is probably to split f as the sum of two functions f A ∶ V → R and f B ∶ V → R held by Alice and Bob. So we consider the following problem:
Definition: For a fixed, commonly known graph G = (V , E), the SumLS(G) communication problem is the following: Alice holds Main Theorem.
(1) The communication complexity of local search on the n-dimensional hypercube with N = 2 n vertices is Ω( ⌋︂ N ).
(2) The communication complexity of local search on a constantdimension grid with N vertices is Ω( ⌋︂ N ). We note that all our bounds hold for randomized communication complexity. Interestingly, the first three bounds are optimal: an algorithm by [2] finds a local optimum with O( ⌋︂ N ) queries in expectation, which clearly implies an analogous communication algorithm with the same efficiency. We begin our proof by considering the communication variant of a pebbling game [10] . D = (V , E) is a known directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the vertices b ∶ V → {0, 1} such that every source is true (b(v) = 1) and every sink is false (b(v) = 0). The output is a false vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v ∈ V such that b(v) = 0 and b(u) = 1 for all u ∈ V , (u,v) ∈ E). [10] consider the communication variant of the game which is obtained by distributing the information b(v) ∈ {0, 1} of every vertex by a constant size index-gadget {0, 1} 3 × (︀3⌋︀ → {0, 1}.
They show that for some constant-degree graph D with N vertices the communication complexity of the problem is Θ( ⌋︂ N ), which is optimal. Our proof is composed of three steps. The first step reduces the pebbling game to a variant of local search on a graph G where Alice holds the function f and Bob holds a set of valid vertices. The goal is to find a local maximum in the subgraph that is composed of the valid vertices. We name this variant VetoLS.
The second step is the most technically challenging one. We first define a notion of embedding one graph into the other, and show that if a graph G can be embedded into H then the communication of VetoLS(H ) is at least that of VetoLS(G). We then show that the graph G obtained in the previous step can be embedded into each of the families considered in the theorem. In order to obtain an optimal bound of Ω( ⌋︂ N ) for VetoLS(H ) (where N is the number of vertices of H ), the number of vertices of G and H must be almost the same. Thus the embedding of G into H is quite delicate and uses the specifics of the graph G. Finally, in the third step we show that the communication complexity of VetoLS on any graph is at least that of local search, thus establishing the theorem.
The constants that are obtained in our theorem are quite big (the dimension of the grid has to be at least 119, and the degree of the constant degree graph is 36). However, we also provide an alternative proof that obtains better constants, at the cost of a worse communication bound. Specifically, we show that there exists a specific family of 4-degree graphs for which the communication complexity of local search is Ω(N c ) for some constant c > 0. We also show a lower bound of the form Ω(N c ) for the three dimensional grid N ×N ×2. The alternative proof uses the more recent and more generic "simulation" lemmas that "lift" lower bounds from the query complexity setting to the communication complexity setting [12, 13, 27] , instead of the "simulation" lemma of [10] that was developed for specific settings like the pebbling game. The main technical difficulty that we overcome is that the "combination gadgets" used in these lemmas (specifically the index function) are very different from the simple sum that we desire. We now describe two applications of our basic lower bound. In both applications we study communication variants of problems that are known to be PLS complete, have low non-deterministic complexity and, as we show, high communication complexity.
Potential Games
The communication requirements for reaching various types of equilibria in different types of games have received a significant amount of recent interest ( [5, 11] ) as they essentially capture the convergence time of arbitrary dynamics in scenarios where each player only knows his own utilities ("uncoupled dynamics" [14, 15] ) and must "learn" information about the others. Of particular importance here is the extensively studied class of potential games [21] .
Definition: An n-player game with strategy sets A 1 , ..., An and utility functions u 1 , ...,un is an exact potential game if there exists a single potential function ϕ ∶ A 1 ×⋯×An → R so that for every player i, every two strategies a i , a ′ i ∈ A i and every tuple of strategies
The game is an ordinal potential function if there exists a single potential function ϕ ∶ A 1 × ⋯ × An → R so that for every player i, every two strategies a i , a ′ i ∈ A i and every tuple of strategies
e., the value of the potential function increases if and only if the player improves his utility.
Note that every ordinal potential game is also exact, but the other direction is not true. The class of exact potential games includes, in particular, all congestion games. A key property of potential games (exact or ordinal) is that every sequence of better responses converges to an equilibrium and therefore every potential game always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
[14] study the communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in ordinal potential games. They consider n-player games where each player has four actions and show (by a reduction from disjointness) that exponential communication is required to distinguish between the case where the game is an ordinal potential game (and thus has a Nash equilibrium) and the case where the game is not a potential game at all and in particular does not admit any pure Nash equilibrium. This immediately implies that finding an equilibrium in ordinal potential games takes exp(n) bits of communication.
Is it easy to find an equilibrium in exact potential games? [24] shows that the number of queries needed to find an equilibrium is exponential (in the number of players), but maybe the communication complexity of the problem is significantly smaller. The technical challenge is again that the non-deterministic communication complexity of the problem is low, i.e, verifying that a certain profile is a Nash equilibrium does not require much communication (each player only has to make sure that he plays his best response). Nevertheless, our first result in this direction provides a ray of hope: in contrast to ordinal potential games, there is a randomized protocol that uses only polylog(⋃︀ A⋃︀) (when ⋃︀ A⋃︀ = ⋃︀ A 1 ⋃︀ ⋅ ... ⋅ ⋃︀ An ⋃︀ is the game size) bits of communication and determines whether the game is an exact potential game or not.
Nevertheless, we then show that although determining whether a game is an exact potential game takes only poly-logarithmic communication, finding an equilibrium requires polynomial (in the size of the game) communication (and in particular exponential in the number of players). These results provide a negative answer to an open question posed in [23] . Theorem 1. For some constant c > 0, the following problem requires at least N c communication (even randomized): Alice gets an N ×N matrix u A and Bob gets an N ×N matrix u B , they are promised that the game defined by these matrices is an exact potential game and they must output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 2. For some constant c > 0, the following problem requires at least 2 cn communication (even randomized): Alice gets the utility functions of the first n players in a 2n-player 2-action game. Bob gets the utility functions of the last n players. They are promised that the game defined by these matrices is an exact potential game and they must output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Recall, in comparison, that [14] only proved that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in n-player 4-action ordinal potential game requires exponential communication.
Our proofs are via reductions from local search on (certain) degree 4 graphs in the two-player N -action case, and from local search on the hypercube in the 2n-player 2-action case. While the relation between equilibria of potential games and local maxima is well known and very simple, the reduction is actually quite subtle. First the neighbourhood structures do not naturally match (in the two-player case), but more crucially the input of the players here is very limited: only very specifically related matrices u A and u B give an (exact) potential game, while the lower bounds for local search were for arbitrary inputs.
We also show that the search for a pure Nash equilibrium in exact potential games can be formulated as a total search problem: Either find a pure Nash equilibrium (that is guaranteed to exist in exact potential games) or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not an exact potential game. Interestingly, such a succinct evidence of violation of exact potential property is guaranteed to exist by [21] . As an immediate corollary from our results we deduce hardness of this total search problem.
Local Optima in Combinatorial Auctions
Our second application concerns attempts to weaken the global optimality constraints in market allocations. Consider a combinatorial auction of m indivisible items among n players, each with his own valuation function v i that gives a real value to every subset of the items. The usual goal is to globally maximize the social welfare ∑ i v i (S i ) over all allocations (S 1 , ..., Sn ) of the items.
A related notion of equilibrium is that of Walrasian equilibrium, which includes an allocation (S 1 , ..., Sn ) and a vector of prices p 1 , ..., pm such that for every player i, the set S i maximizes the profit of player i at these prices. The first welfare theorem guarantees that the equilibrium allocation (S 1 , ..., Sn ) maximizes the social welfare. While these notions provide very strong guarantees, they are usually "too good to be true": Walrasian equilibria only rarely exist and optimizing social welfare is usually infeasible in essentially any sense of the word, and in particular in the sense of requiring exponential communication [25] .
Several papers have tried to relax the notion of a Walrasian equilibrium or similarly view the allocation problem as a game and analyze the equilibria in this game. In particular, in the model of simultaneous second price auctions [7] it is easy to see that when the valuations are submodular every allocation that is locally optimal can be part of an equilibrium in the game, and the same goes for the endowed equilibrium of [4] . Recall that a locally optimal allocation in a combinatorial auction is an allocation of the items (S 1 , . . . , Sn ) such that transferring any single item j ∈ S i to some other player i ′ does not improve the welfare.
Since local optima play a central role in various relaxed notions of equilibria, an obvious question is whether they are easy to find. In [4] it is shown that for some succinctly represented submodular valuations it is PLS hard to compute a locally optimal allocation in combinatorial auction. They also show that in the query model finding a locally optimal allocation is as hard as finding a local maximum in the odd graph. Combining the reduction of [4] with our communication hardness of local search on the odd graph, we get that: Theorem 3. The communication complexity of finding a locally optimal allocation between two players with submodular valuations is 2 Ω(n) .
LOCAL SEARCH IN GRAPHS
In this section we provide communication lower bounds on the communication complexity of local search over several families of graphs.
Theorem 2.1. The following bound holds for the randomized communication complexity of SumLS:
, when H is a grid with a constant dimension (119) grid with N vertices.
n is the number of vertices.
We note again that results 1, 2, and 3 are optimal since [2] provides a randomized algorithm that finds a local maximum in these graph using O( ⌋︂ N ) queries. Result 4, on the other hand, is not necessarily optimal because the odd graph has N ≈ 4 n vertices, so in terms of the number of vertices our lower bound is Ω(
Result 3 proves an optimal bound for a grid with a constant dimension, but this dimension is quite large (119). We are able to show that finding a local optimum in the three-dimensional grid is hard, but our lower bound in this case is only Ω(N c ), for some constant c > 0 (in contrast to an optimal bound of Ω( ⌋︂ N ) for the 119-dimensional grid). To prove this, we first show that finding a local maximum is hard even for degree 4 graphs.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a constant c > 0 such that the randomized communication complexity of SumLS satisfies:
The overall structure of the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 is similar, but the proofs use different techniques. The proof of Theorem 2.1 appears in Section 3 and the proof of Theorem 2.2 is relegated to the full version.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1: OPTIMAL BOUNDS FOR LOCAL SEARCH
Our starting point is a communication variant of a pebbling game. Let D = (V , E) be a directed acyclic graph. The input is a boolean assignment for the vertices b ∶ V → {0, 1} such that every source is true (b(v) = 1) and every sink is false (b(v) = 0). The output is a false vertex whose all predecessors are true (i.e., v ∈ V such that b(v) = 0 and b(u) = 1 for all u ∈ V , (u,v) ∈ E). Note that the problem is total. The communication variant of the pebbling game Pebb(D) is defined by distributing the information b(v) ∈ {0, 1} of every vertex by a constant size index-gadget {0, 1} 3 × (︀3⌋︀ → {0, 1}. In [10] it is shown that there exists a constant degree graph D with N vertices where the randomized communication complexity of the problem is Θ( ⌋︂ N ).
Our proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. We introduce an intermediate communication problem VetoLS(G) where Alice holds the potential function and Bob holds a subset of valid vertices (equivalently, Bob vetoes the vertices that are not in the set that he holds). The goal is to find a valid local maximum: a valid vertex whose valid neighbours have (weakly) lower potential. Given a graph D as above, we construct a constant degree graph G with O(N ) vertices and reduce Pebb(D) to VetoLS(G). This gives us an optimal communication lower bound for VetoLS for a concrete graph G.
Step 2. We define a certain notion of "embedding" of one graph into the other. We show that if G can be embedded into H , then CC(VetoLS(H )) ≥ CC(VetoLS(G)). We use this observation to prove optimal hardness bound for VetoLS over the hypercube by embedding G into an hypercube of dimension log(N ) + c for a constant c.
Step 3. For every graph G, we show that CC(VetoLS(G)) ≈ CC(SumLS(G)).
Throughout the proof we make the distinctness assumption: that the inputs (fa, f b ) are such that (fa + f b )(v) ≠ (fa + f b )(w) for all {v, w} ∈ E. This assumption is without loss of generality by the following reduction: the input (fa, f b ) can be converted to (2N fa + ind(v), 2N f b ), where ind(v) is the index of a vertex. Obviously the input (2N fa + ind(v), 2N f b ) satisfies distinctness, and it is easy to verify that a local maximum of 2N (fa + f b ) + ind(v) is also local maximum of fa + f b . We now provide a detailed description of each step.
Starting Point: Pebbling Games
In Section 3.3 we use the specific structure of the constant degree graph D for which the hardness of the pebbling game is proved. We therefore start with an explicit description of the graph D.
The vertices of D are given by
where the ±1 addition in the last three coordinates is done modulo M. The addition in the first coordinate is the standard addition.
Thus, each vertex has six predecessors:
The sources of the graph are {(1, ⋅, ⋅, ⋅)} and its sinks are {(M 3 , ⋅, ⋅, ⋅)}.
In [10] 
Step 1: From Pebbling to VetoLS
Given a graph G, the communication problem VetoLS(G) is defined as follows. Alice's input is a function f ∶ V → (︀W ⌋︀. Bob's input is a non-empty subset S ⊂ V . The output is a vertex v ∈ S such that f (v) ≥ f (w) for every w ∈ S such that {v, w} ∈ E (i.e., for every valid neighbour). We show that the communication complexity of VetoLS(G) is at least that of Pebb(D), for some G that is related to D. Next we show how to obtain the graph G from D.
We construct the graph G in two stages. First, given a graph D of the pebbling game, let G ′ be an undirected version of D which additionally has an edge from every source of D to some sink of D. Second, let G be the graph that is obtained from G ′ by replacing each vertex in G with three vertices. We duplicate the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the three copies of its neighbors in G ′ . We call the graph G the replication graph of D. 
. We use this to define the potential function f that Alice holds in
Namely, among the three copies of v only the one with correct index is valid. This choice of valid vertices has the desirable property that the subgraph of valid vertices is precisely G ′ and the assignment b(v, i)
over the vertices of G ′ is precisely the decomposed assignment b(v, I (v)).
We argue that the local maxima of f are precisely all false vertices whose all incoming neighbours are true. Those are indeed local maxima, because their "predecessors" do not have the bonus of 6N and their "successors" have lower topological number. The source cannot be a local maximum because it is a "true" vertex and it is connected to a sink that is a "false" vertex. A true vertex (other than source) is not local maximum because its predecessor has higher topological number. Similarly, a false vertex with false predecessor is not local maximum. This leaves us only with false vertices whose predecessors are true vertices. □
Step 2: Embedding the Bounded Degree Graph
In this step we define a certain notion of embedding of one graph into another. We will see that if a graph G can be embedded into H then the communication complexity of local search on H is essentially at least as large as the communication complexity of local search on G. We will then see how to embed the graph G of the previous steps into the hypercube, a constant-dimension grid, and the odd graph (the last two embeddings can be found in the full version.
where P(H ) is the set of simple paths on H , such that:
• φ is injective.
• For every edge {v, w} ∈ E G , the path χ ({v, w}) connects φ(v) to φ(w).
• The interior vertices of the paths χ ({v, w}) and χ ({v
are disjoint (edge disjointness).
• For every v ∈ V G and every {w,
in H of the vertex from the path (vertex isolation).
That is, in a VIED embedding every edge of G is replaced by a path in H that connects the corresponding vertices such that these paths do not share a vertex. Moreover, for every v ∈ V G , φ(v) is isolated in the sense that no path passes through the neighbours of φ(v).
Lemma 3.4. Let G be a graph and suppose it can be VIED embedded into some other graph H . Then CC(VetoLS(G)) ≤ CC(VetoLS(H )).
Proof. Alice's potential is defined as follows. For vertices
that belongs to an edge {u,v} ∈ E G . Suppose that w is the k'th element in the path χ ({u,v}) and l is the total length of this path. Define:
In all other vertices Alice's potential will not play a role because these vertices will not be valid, thus we can simply set f H (w) ≡ 0 for all other vertices.
We recall that Bob's input in VetoLS(G) is
If v ∈ V G is a valid local maximum, then φ(v) ∈ V H is a valid local maximum because all its valid neighbours are valid edges in which v participates (here we use the isolation property), and the value along these edges is a weighted average of f G (v) and
, where u is a valid neighbour of v.
We argue that there are no additional valid local maxima in
is not a local maximum because there is a valid edge where the potential increases. If w ∈ χ (E G (S G )), by distinctness, f G (u) ≠ f G (v) therefore in one of the directions of the path χ ({u,v}) the potential increases. All other vertices are invalid. □ 3.3.1 An Explicit Description of the Graph G. In the embeddings we use the specifics of the DAG D for which the hardness of pebbling games is proved in [10] . We now explicitly describe the replication graph G that is obtained from D so that Proposition 3.2 can be applied. Let G ′ be the undirected version of the DAG D with additional edges that connect the sources and sinks of D in a same way other vertices in D are connected. Formally, the vertices of G ′ are V = (︀M 3 ⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀, and the edges are:
Let G be the graph that is obtained from G ′ by replacing each vertex in G with three new vertices and duplicating the edges so that each new vertex is connected to all the copies of its neighbors in G ′ . Formally, the vertices of G are {(v, i) ∶ v ∈ V , i ∈ (︀3⌋︀} and the edges are {((u, i), (v, j)) ∶ (u,v) ∈ E, i, j ∈ (︀3⌋︀}. Note that G is a graph with 3M 6 vertices and (constant) degree d = 36.
Embedding into the Hypercube.
In this section we embed the replication graph G obtained in the previous step into the hypercube. Moreover, the embedding is such that the number of vertices in the hypercube increases only by a constant factor. This small blowup is crucial for obtaining an optimal 2 n⇑2 bound. 1 By χ (E G (S G )) we obviously mean the corresponding vertices in these paths.
Lemma 3.5. The graph G (with 3M 6 vertices) can be VIED-embedded into the n'th-dimensional hypercube Hyp n for n = 6[︂log M⌉︂ + 111. As a corollary, CC(VetoLS(Hyp n )) = Ω(2 n⇑2 ).
Proof. For clarity of exposition we assume that M = 2 c is a power of 2. We start with some notations and properties of the graph G. Recall that the vertices of G are V = (︀M 3 ⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀ × (︀M⌋︀ × ) . Note that we have 6 ⋅ 9 = 54 such specifications. It is easy to verify that coloring these edges in 54 different colors is a valid edge coloring. We proceed by coloring all edges between layers 2 and 3 with different 54 colors using a similar coloring method. Similarly, all edges from layer 2k − 1 to layer 2k are colored as edges between layers 1 and 2 and all edges from layer 2k to layer 2k + 1 are colored as edges between layers 2 and 3. This defines an edge coloring of G.
We now partition the vertices of the hypercube into blocks as follows:
• For i = 1, ..., 5 the i'th index block consists of bits that represent the i'th index. The sizes of the blocks are (3c, c, c, c, 2) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 correspondingly.
• A parity bit memorizes the parity of a vertex.
• The edge block consists of 108 bits.
• The counter block consists of 3 bits that serves as a counter to keep track of the block on which we currently apply the changes along the embedding path (see below).
Embedding the vertices. Let (h 1 , ..., h M 3 ) be a Hamiltonian path of the 3c-dimensional hypercube. Let (h 
into the vertex of the hypercube whose first block is the bits of h k 1 , the second block is h
. We set the parity bit to be the parity of v, the edge block to 0, and the counter block to 0.
Embedding the edges. Note that the coloring of G in 108 colors naturally induces an order on the edges. Every vertex has at most one m'th edge, and two adjacent vertices agree on the index of this edge. The m'th edge of v, from v in layer k 1 to u in layer k 1 + 1, is defined by the following sequence of bit flipping.
(1) The m'th bit in the edge block is flipped to 1. It is easy to see that this path ends up at ϕ(u) (note that the parity of v and u is the same, and indeed we did not flip the parity bit). We argue that the defined paths are disjoint. It is sufficient to prove that given a node on the path one can recover the previous node. Given the color of the edge and the counter, it is immediate to recover the previous node in all intermediate steps excluding steps (3) and (5). In steps (3) and (5) it is unclear whether we should flip the corresponding index block or the counter block. To determine this we use the parity bit: In step (3), if the parity bit is equal to the parity of the encoded vertices, then it means that we did not flip yet a bit, and to get the previous vertex we set the counter block to encode 0. If the parity bit differs from the parity of the encoded indices, then it means that we have flip a bit, and to get the previous vertex we should flip a bit in the index block. In step (5) we do the opposite. If the parity bit differs from the parity of the encoded indices, then we flip the counter. If the parity bit is equal to the parity of the encoded indices, then we flip the index block.
It is easy to check that the embedding is vertex isolated because of the parity bit. □
Step 3: From VetoLS to SumLS
First, recall that the potential function gets values in (︀W ⌋︀. We reduce the problem VetoLS(G) to SumLS(G). Alice's potential remains unchanged (i.e., f A (v) ∶= f G (v)). Bob fixes some valid vertex v * ∈ S and sets his potential as follows:
Indeed every valid local maximum v is a local maximum of the sum because all the valid neighbours have lower sum of potentials
and all invalid neighbours have negative sum of potentials f A (w) + f B (w) ≤ W − (W + 1) < 0. It is easy to check that every valid vertex that is not a local maximum is not a local maximum of the sum. Finally, every invalid vertex v is not a local maximum of the sum because the neighbour w in the direction of the shortest path to v * has higher sum of potentials:
We apply this reduction on the graphs considered in Lemmas 3.5 (the hypercube), and in the full version to the constant dimension grid and the odd graph to deduce the theorem.
THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF EXACT POTENTIAL GAMES
Recall that a game is an exact potential game if there exists a po-
, a −i ) for every player i, every pair of actions a i , a ′ i ∈ A i , and every profile of the opponents a −i ∈ A −i . In this section we study the communication complexity of exact potential games. We assume that each of the players knows only his own utility function and the goal is to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in the game. In game theoretic settings this form of information distribution is called uncoupledness [14, 15] . It is known that the communication complexity of computing an equilibrium captures (up to a logarithmic factor) the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics to equilibrium [8, 14] .
As a preliminary result, we demonstrate that determining whether a game is an exact potential game (under the uncoupled distribution of information) requires poly-logarithmic communication. In contrast, determining whether a game is an ordinal potential game requires polynomial communication (see the full version). Proposition 4.1. Consider a game with n players and N actions. There exists a randomized communication protocol that determines whether the game is an exact potential game or not that uses only poly(log(N ), n) bits of communication.
The proof is quite simple, and we demonstrate it here for 2-player games. Monderer and Shapley [21] show that a two-player game (A, B,u A ,u B ) is an exact potential game if and only if for every four actions a, a ′ ∈ A, and b, b ′ ∈ B we have
Namely, the sum of gains/losses from unilateral divinations over every cycle of size four should sum up to zero. Now each player checks, for every possible four-action cycle, whether the sum of changes in his utility equals the negative of the change in utility of the other player for the same cycle. Verifying this simultaneously for all cycles can be done by applying any efficient protocol for the equality problem (we recall that we focus on randomized communication protocols). For a general number of players, a similar characterization exists and we have to use protocols based on the "equal sum" problem as demonstrated below.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By [21] , an n-player game (A,u) is an exact potential game if and only if for every pair of permutations π , π over (︀n⌋︀ and for every pair of action profiles a, b ∈ A we have
Simply speaking, for every sequence of unilateral deviations that starts at a goes back and forth to b, where each player changes his strategy from a i to b i once and from b i to a i once, the sum in the gains/losses of all players from the unilateral divinations should sum up to 0.
The players should check whether Equation (3) of the players is to determine whether ∑ i∈(︀n⌋︀ v i = 0c . This variant of the equality problem has a poly(logW , log c) = poly(n, log N ) randomized communication protocol [22, 30] . □
The contrast between the hardness of determining whether a game is an ordinal potential game and the easiness of determining whether a game is an exact potential game might give some hope that computing an equilibrium in exact potential games is much easier than in ordinal potential games. Unfortunately, our main results for this section show that finding a Nash equilibrium remains hard even for exact potential games. We can also show hardness for the 2n-player 2-action case. Theorem 4.3. Consider the two-party promise communication problem where Alice holds the utilities of (u i ) i∈(︀n⌋︀ and Bob holds the utilities (u i ) i∈(︀2n⌋︀∖(︀n⌋︀ of an exact potential game, and they should output a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. The problem requires 2 Ω(n) communication, even for randomized protocols.
This problem is obviously requires at least as much communication as the 2n-party communication problem where each player holds his own utility function.
In both theorems, we reduce from the problem of finding a local maximum (on a bounded degree graph in the two player case and on the hypercube in the n player case) and show that the set of pure Nash equilibria corresponds exactly to the set of local maxima. The proofs of the Theorems appear in Sections 5 and 6.
Total Variants of Pure Nash Equilibrium Search
In Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 we have demonstrated communicational hardness of two promise problems. Such hardness results are not rare in the literature. For instance, finding a pure Nash equilibrium in a game when it is promised that such an equilibrium exists.
To appreciate the novelty of our results we focus on a total variant of equilibrium search problem TotExPot: either find a Nash equilibrium or provide a succinct evidence that the game is not an exact potential game. By [21] such a succinct evidence, in the form of a violating cycle (see Equations (2), (3)), necessarily exists. More formally, in the problem TotExPot(2, N ) Alice holds the utility u A , Bob holds a utility u B of an N × N game, and the output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a cycle of actions of size 4 that violates Equation (2) . Similarly, in the problem TotExPot(2n, 2) Alice holds the utilities (u i ) i∈n , Bob holds the utilities (u i ) i∈(︀2n⌋︀∖(︀n⌋︀ of an 2n-player 2-action game, and the output is either a pure Nash equilibrium or a cycle of actions of size 4n that violates Equation (3) .
In Proposition 4.1 we showed that low communication is needed to determine whether a game is an exact potential game or not (accompanied with an evidence in case it is not). From these observation along with Theorem 4.2 we deduce that Corollary 4.4. The total search problem TotExPot(2, N ) requires poly(N ) communication.
Similarly to the 2n-player 2-action case we have: Corollary 4.5. The total search problem TotExPot(2n, 2) requires 2 Ω(n) communication.
Note that the non-deterministic complexity of TotExPot(2, N ) is log(N ). Indeed, a Nash equilibrium can be described by single action profile (Θ(log N ) bits), and a violating cycle can be described by 4 action profiles. Each player can verify his best-reply condition and communicate a single bit to the opponent. Verification of violating cycle can be done by low communication as well, by communicating 4 utility values. Similarly, we can show that the non-deterministic complexity of TotExPot(2n, n) is poly(n). Thus again, our results demonstrate an exponential separation between the non-deterministic and the randomized communication complexity of a total search problem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2: TWO-PLAYER POTENTIAL GAMES
We reduce the problem of finding a local maximum on a graph G with degree 4 to finding a Nash equilibrium in an exact potential game with two players and N actions. We then apply Theorem 2.2(1) to get our communication bound. We construct the following exact potential game. For a vertex v ∈ V we denote by n i (v) the i'th neighbour of v for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The strategy set of both players is A = B = V × (︀W ⌋︀ 5 (recall that the potentials in SumLS(G) get values in (︀W ⌋︀ and that W = poly(N )). The interpretation of a strategy (v, x) ∈ A where → x = (x 0 , x 1 , ..., x 4 ) ∈ (︀W ⌋︀ 5 is (Alice's reported) potential for v and its four neighbours. This report induces a valuation for all vertices w ∈ V by
Bob's strategy (w, → y ) induces a valuation val (w, → y ) (v) on all vertices v ∈ V , and a truthful report is similarly defined. The utilities of Alice and Bob are given by (recall that d(v, w) is the distance in the graph between two vertices v and w):
Namely, both players get large reward of 4W if they choose adjacent vertices, or the same vertex. Both players get large reward of 4W if they report truthfully their own valuations in the neighbourhood of their vertex. Both players get the sum of valuations of the two chosen vertices v, w according to the report of the opponent. In addition Alice gets the (partial) potential of her vertex according to f A , and Bob gets the potential of his vertex according to f B .
Lemma 5.1. The game is an exact potential game.
Proof. We will see that the game can be "decomposed" to two exact potential games, and will use this "decomposition" to provide a potential function for our game. We will use the following basic properties of potential games. We recall the notation of (A 1 , A 2 ,u 1 ,u 2 ) = (A,u) for a two-player game, where each A i is the action space of player i and u i is the utility function of player i.
• An identical interest game (A,u) is a game in which u 1 = u 2 . An identical interest game is an exact potential game with potential function φ = u 1 .
• An opponent independent game is a game in which the utility of each player i depends only on his own actions:
game is an exact potential game where the potential function is simply the sum of the utilities of the players.
• For every pair of exact potential games (A,u ′ ), (A,u ′′ ) with
Note that our game can be written as a sum of an identical interest game:
and an opponent independent game: u
Therefore their sum is a potential game with potential: Proof. Pure Nash equilibria are the local maxima (with respect to a unilateral deviation) of the potential. It is easy to check that in a local maximum x and y are truth reports, because the gain in a truthful report is 4W whereas if the players do not report truthfully they lose this reward. However, Alice can gain at most (4)):
A profile where v ≠ w is not a Nash equilibrium because by the distinctness assumption,
and increase the potential; Otherwise Bob can deviate to (v, → x ) and increase the potential. Finally, a profile ((v, → x ), (v, → x ′ )) with truth reporting is clearly a Nash equilibrium if it is a local maximum of f A + f B . If v is not a local maximum of f A + f B , then Alice will increase the potential (given in Equation (5)) if she deviates to the action (w, n(w)) where w is a neighbour of v with
. □ Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 complete the proof of the theorem.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3: n-PLAYER POTENTIAL GAMES
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is done in two steps. First, we show a 2
bound. This is the significant part, in terms of the deduced result and also in terms of the techniques. Thereafter, in the full version we improve the bound to 2 Ω(n) building upon the arguments of this Section. We start with proving the 2 Ω( 3 ⌋︂ n) bound. Our starting point is the proof of the hardness of 2-player n-actions exact potential games (Theorem 4.2). However, since we consider n-player binaryaction games, it is convenient to reduce the problem SumLS(Hyp n ) (local search on the n-th hypercube). We will get an exact potential game with Θ(n 3 ) players, where each player has only two actions.
A naive approach and an obstacle. The simplest idea that comes to mind is to consider a group of n-players who will choose v ∈ Hyp n , and a group of (n + 1)[︂logW ⌉︂ players who will report the valuation vector → x of the vertex itself and its n neighbours, and similarly for Bob. We would like to set the group of Alice's players an identical utility that is similar to the utility of Alice in the twoplayer game. An obstacle that arises with this approach is that if the groups of Alice's and Bob's players are playing two adjacent vertices v, w ∈ Hyp n with truthful valuations, none of them will want to switch to the opponent's vertex, even if at the adjacent vertex the sum of f A + f B is higher. This follows from the observation that if (v, → x ) is a truthful valuation, then (w, → x ) is not necessarily a truthful valuation (because the relevant vertices and their order is different with respect to v and with respect to w). Thus, players in Alice's group will gain the difference in the potentials (at most 3W ) but lose 4W because now the group report is not truthful. Note that the same obstacle does not arise in the two-player case. In the two-player case Alice could change the vertex v and the report → x simultaneously. In the n-player case we consider unilateral deviations that correspond to changes of single bits and thus such simultaneous deviations are impossible.
The solution to the obstacle. To resolve the above problematic issue, we modify the form of the report → x in the game.
• 
We denote → x = ( → xv, → x f ). Similar to the two-player case, a report → x = ( → xv, → x f ) defines a valuation function over all vertices. For a list → xv we denote I min ( → xv) ∶= {i ∈ (︀m⌋︀ ∶ xv i ≠ xv j for all j < i} the set of indices with first appearance of a vertex. The valuation is defined by
where val(⋅) ∈ (︀W ⌋︀ denotes the numerical value of the binary string. Note that in case of multiple appearances of w in the list we choose the value at the first appearance. Similarly for Bob, we have three groups who jointly choose w, → yw, and → y f . The report → y defines a valuation function val → y over all vertices. Note that the total number of players in the game is 2(n + m(n + b)) = O(n 3 ).
Before we present the actual utilities we informally describe the prioritization according to which we set the utilities. In the two-player case there were only two levels of prioritization: the top level priority included the distance d(v, w) (the 1 d (v,w )≤1 term in the utility functions) and the truthfulness of the report (the 1 x =n(v) term in the utility functions). As for the bottom level priority, it included the remaining potential related terms (val
More formally by prioritization we mean that improving the higher priority term by 1 should increase the utility irrespective of how the lower priority terms change. Indeed the multiplier 4W was set in such a way. In the current construction, the prioritization levels are more involved, and we sketch them here from the highest priority to the lowest.
(1) The distance d(v, w).
(2) The list → xv should contain v and its neighbours. Now we describe what is the analogue of each one of these priorities in the n-player case. Hereafter, d(⋅, ⋅) will denote the hamming distance (in the corresponding dimension). We denote by Br (v) the ball of radius r around v with respect to the hamming distance.
( (3) Given v and → xv, for an index i ∈ I min ( → xv) such that xv i ∈ B 1 (v) we have at the third priority the term −d(x f , bin(f A (xv i )) when we recall that bin(z) ∈ {0, 1} b represents the binary representation of the potential value z ∈ (︀W ⌋︀. Note that this definition takes into account only the first appearance of every neighbour, which is consistent with the definition of val → x . For other indices i ∈ (︀m⌋︀ the term will be identical but it will appear at the lowest sixth priority. (4) The profile (v, → x ), (w, → y ) defines a natural analogue of the two-player potential terms:
These terms are at the forth priority. (6) Finally, similarly to item 3, given v and → xv, for every index i ∈ (︀m⌋︀ we have at the sixth priority the term −d(x f , bin(f A (xv i )). Now we are ready to define the utilities. As was mentioned above all the players in Alice's groups have identical utilities which is equal to:
when we set k 1 , ..., k 6 as follows. We set k 6 = 1. Now we set k 5 to be greater than the maximal difference of sixth priority terms, e.g., k 5 = 2n 2 b > mb. Now we set k 4 to be the greater than the maximal total difference of sixth and fifth priority terms, e.g.,
Similarly we may proceed with
Similarly we define each member in Bob's group to have the following identical utility function:
Lemma 6.1. The defined (2n + 2m(n + b))-player binary action game is an exact potential game.
Proof. If we view the game as a two-player game where Alice chooses (s,x) and Bob chooses (r ,ŷ) the game is an exact potential game by similar arguments to those in Lemma 5.1. Namely it is the sum of two games where one is identical interest game and the other is opponent independent game. The potential function of the game is given by: Note that by replacing Alice (Bob) by a group of n + m(n + b) players all with the same utility we only reduced the set of possible unilateral deviations. For each one of these unilateral deviation by the two-player result the change in the utility is equal to the change in the potential. □ Lemma 6.2. Every pure Nash equilibrium of the defined (2n + 2m(n + b))-player binary action game is of the form (v, → x ,v, → y ) where v is a local maximum of f A + f B over the hypercube.
Proof. The proof proceeds by narrowing the set of equilibria candidates according to the prioritization levels, with a twist at the fourth priority level.
First, in every equilibrium d(v, w) ≤ 1 because otherwise there exists a player in Alice's v group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch increases the first term in the utility of the group by k 1 . By the choice of k 1 , any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller.
Second, in every equilibrium → xv ∈ N 1 (v), because otherwise there exists a player in Alice's → xv group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch does not effect the first term of the utility, and it increases the second term by k 2 . By the choice of k 2 , any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob we have → yw ∈ N 1 (w).
Third, in every equilibrium for every i ∈ I min ( → xv) such that xv i ∈ B 1 (v) we have x f i = bin(f A (xv i )). Simply speaking, all first appearances of elements in B 1 (v) (which indeed appear by the argument regarding the second priority level) have correct valuation. If it wasn't so, then there exists a player in Alice's → x f i group who can switch his strategy and decrease the distance by 1. Such a switch does not affect the first two terms of the utility, and it increases the third term by k 3 . By the choice of k 3 , any change in the other terms of utilities is smaller. Similarly for Bob, all first appearances of elements in B 1 (w) have correct valuation. Now we jump to the fifth and the sixth priority levels. Given that v, w are neighbours (or the same vertex) and their values already appear in the report → x the terms of the utility in the fourth priority level are not affected by the vertices xv i such that i ∉ I min ( → xv) or xv i ∉ B 1 (v). Therefore, we can deduce that necessarily in equilibrium we have → xv ∈ N 2 (v) because otherwise some player in the → xv group can decrease the distance by 1 without affecting any of the first four terms, and increase the fifth term by k 5 . Any change in the last terms is smaller. Similarly we can argue for the sixth priority level, that the values of x f i for the corresponding indices do not affect any other term. From these arguments it follows that in any equilibrium both Alice (and Bob) report a list → xv ( → yw) that contains exactly all the vertices in the ball of radius 2 around v (w), moreover all valuations of all these vertices are correct. Now we go back to the fourth priority. Assume by way of contradiction that v ≠ w. Similarly to the two-player case, the fourth term in the potential function of the game is val Assume by way of contradiction that v ≠ w, then we may assume w.l.o.g. that f A (w) + f B (w) ≥ f A (v) + f B (v) + 1 (we recall that we may assume that the sum defers at adjacent vertices and has integer values), then there exists a player in Alice's v group who can switch his bit and turn the vertex v into w. Let us examine the effect of this change on the potential. The first priority level term remains 0. The key observation is that the second and third priority level terms also remain 0. Note that the list → xv includes all the vertices within radius 2 from v, and in particular all the vertices within radius 1 from w. Similarly the valuations → x f of these vertices remain correct. Therefore the potential increases by at least k 4 in the first four terms, and any change in the fifth and sixth terms is smaller.
Finally for the case of v = w where v is not a local maximum we apply very similar arguments: There exists a player in Alice's group who can increase the potential of the game by k 3 and change only the fifth and sixth terms of the potential. □ Lemmas 6.1, and 6.2 complete the proof of the 2 Ω( 3 ⌋︂ n) bound.
